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Russian–US arms control, the strategic nuclear balance between Russia and the
United States and, to a lesser extent, US deployment of theater and national mis-
sile defenses have in recent years dropped off the list of important issues
for international diplomacy. This shift has not occurred because those who
champion arms control are misguided, or because nuclear weapons are no longer
unimaginably destructive. Nor does it reflect a judgment that arms control failed
during the Cold War, or that missile defenses produce only positive results. Instead,
this change in focus reflects the facts that the Cold War has been over for more than
a decade and that the security threats and agendas that once dominated foreign
and defense policy have been replaced by the war on terrorism, the need to deal
with the general spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and a
growing realization that Islam is being used by the kleptocracies of the Middle East
to hide totalitarianism, poverty, and hate. Under these circumstances, it is not clear
how arms control with Russia, a junior member of NATO through its participation
in the Partnership for Peace Program, would have much impact on anyone’s
security.
In Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future (a veritable
tour of the global nuclear landscape), Michael Krepon addresses the changing
strategic and political developments that have placed arms control on the back
burner of international diplomacy. Krepon is a major figure in the US arms control
community and a champion in the fight to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. Not surprisingly, his analysis is based on an eclectic mix of partisan
commentary about the lost battle to preserve the ABM Treaty, an overview of the
history and folklore of Cold War arms control, and a commentary on the problems
created by the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
resulting emergence of a complicated set of nuclear relationships that now span the
globe. Krepon acknowledges that the Russian–US strategic relationship no longer
dominates arms control or defense policy agendas, even though at times he
stridently predicts that the deployment of missile defenses will have a negative
impact on several enduring rivalries.
Because partisan politics and policy advocacy have more to do with marketing
than with either scholarly analysis or calm reflection, policies are rarely as awful or
as beneficial as their partisan critics and advocates suggest. Thus, Krepon is at his
best when he takes a step back from his role as policy advocate to explore the likely
ways in which security threats will emerge over the coming decades. For example,
he concludes that limited US national missile defenses would provide modest
benefits (for example, provide protection from an accidental missile launch)
without stirring up much trouble. He also notes, however, that if the United States
builds a highly capable missile defense, improves its counterforce capabilities, and
rides roughshod over the legitimate security concerns of Russian and Chinese
officials, then missile defenses will damage relations with Moscow and Beijing and
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spark a serious arms race. To his credit, Krepon acknowledges that the history of
US efforts to construct missile defenses suggests that we will only see modest
defenses being built in the years ahead and that a general spirit of cooperation can
improve relations between Washington and a nuclear-armed Russia and China. In
other words, when Krepon assesses his own calculus of the risks and benefits
provided by national missile defense, his analysis supports existing policy, although
he would have preferred to deploy a missile defense within the context of a
modified ABM Treaty.
For a book presumably directed toward the future, however, Cooperative Threat
Reduction, Missile Defense, and The Nuclear Future appears overly focused on the past,
or at least on traditional security threats. Krepon seems preoccupied with the need
to somehow move the Russian–US arms control and disarmament agenda forward,
even though the most troublesome threats to international security are posed by
the systemic failure to stop the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
and associated delivery systems. Few oppose the Nunn-Lugar initiatives intended to
decommission surplus Soviet nuclear systems, and it is difficult to see how further
arms reductions will improve Russian–US relations given that concerns about the
nuclear balance generate little political interest in either Moscow or Washington.
Krepon champions Cooperative Threat ReductionFan amorphous mix of
confidence-building measures, diplomacy, and disarmament initiativesFwith
China and Russia. But relations between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow have
less to do with the nuclear balance than with differing political viewpoints and
preferences for the future. From their Cold War peak, Russian and US leaders have
reduced their deployed nuclear forces by about 80 percent; it is hard to take
seriously the notion that anyone suffers sleepless nights worrying about an
unconstrained arms race.
Krepon has little to say about the ‘‘axis of evil,’’ the Bush administration’s
shorthand for the three dictatorships that are arming themselves with chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. He is ambivalent about the counterproliferation
war against Iraq, suggesting that disarming Saddam will only send a message to
troublemakers that they should possess nuclear weapons before they confront the
United States. But he fails to consider what message might be sent if the United
States and the international community stood by as states armed themselves with
weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, he is not all that supportive of the Bush
administration’s tough stand against certain countries, noting that no such thing as
a good or a bad nuclear weapon exists. This is a fair point, but it ignores the more
important political and practical fact that not all regimes are careful and cautious
custodians of their nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals. Even more disturbing
is that sometimes these regimes are beyond the reach of reason and history,
multilateral initiatives, international law, diplomacy, cooperative overtures, incen-
tives and inducements, and the most blatant forms of coercion, preferring to defy
the international community rather than participate in cooperative solutions to
security issues.
Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future offers important
insights into the theoretical and policy preferences of those who advocate
disarmament, cooperation, and diplomacy as the best ways to address today’s most
challenging security threats. It also provides insights into how the historical record
and dominant theories of arms control and deterrence are viewed by a leading
disarmament advocate. This is a narrative that has been recently overwhelmed by
the vision of history and theory articulated by Krepon’s more hawkish colleagues
(see, for example, Joseph 2001; Payne 2001). Yet, the fundamental question
facing disarmament and arms control advocates remains unanswered in Cooperative
Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future: How can cooperative
measures address the hard cases of proliferation that face the international
community today?
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